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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
KNUDSEN :JiliSIC COMPANY, a ) 
corporation, 




Defendant and Appellant. , 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7696 
(All italics, unless otherwise noted, are appellant's). 
In this action, plaintiff, Knudsen Music Company, 
sued the defendant, Jack Masterson, to recover damages 
for the breach of a conditional sales contract, after the 
coin operated music machines sold to defendant had 
been repossessed (Ex. A, R. 3). The contract sued upon 
is a title retaining contract containing the usual pro-
visions for remedies of the vendor in case of default 
(Ex. A). 
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For the convenience of the Court, the following por-
tion of paragraph six of the contract relating to rights 
after repossession is set out below: 
4
'In the event of such repossession seller 1nay 
resell the said property at either public or private 
sale without demand for performance, with or 
without notice to purchaser (if given notice by 
I nail to address below shall be sufficient) with or 
without having such property at the place of sale, 
and upon such terms and in such manner as seller 
may determine; seller may bid at any sale. The 
proceeds of any such sale, after deducting all 
liens, expenses for retaking, repairing and sell-
ing such property, including a reasonable attor-
ney fee or other expense incurred, shall be applied 
to the amount due under this- contract and the 
surplus, if any, shall be paid to purchaser; in the 
event of a deficiency remaining after the exercise 
of any of the remedies herein provided for, pur-
chaser agrees to pay the amount of such deficiency 
forthwith and any reasonable attorney fee and 
court costs incurred for the recovery of such 
deficiency." 
The case was tried before the Court and plaintiffs 
given judgment for the sum of $748.11, representing 
the balance due on purchase price after allowing defend-
ant a credit for the repossessed machines of $1,185.00, 
and allowing plaintiff $30.00 for services in picking up 
the music machines and $42.15 finance charges. In addi-
tion, plaintiff was allowed $200.00 attorney's fee and 
costs, a total judgment of $964.51. Defendant appeals 
from this judgment. 
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The final contraet "~as entered into on ~....,ebruary 27, 
1950, upon the transfer of t\Yo ~[odel 1100 Wurlitzer 
Phonograph n1achines, included in ~ previous title re-
taining contract, to the vendor by the Yendee in exehange 
for two Model 1080 \\:rurlitzer Phonographs. These 
1100's w·ere replaced by 1080's because of complaints 
that the 1100's \vere defective (Tr. -±5, 69, 89, 90). The 
defendant had already in his possession two Model 1015 
\Vurlitzer Phonograph machines and one Gismo, 'vhieh 
'vere included in the contraet (Ex. A, Tr. 6, 9, 10, 42, 
44). 
The two Model 1080 Phonograph machines, Serial 
Nos. 1949532 and 1950227, were picked up by the defend-
ant on February 27, 1950, in Provo, Utah, at plaintiff's 
place of business. 
The J\Iodel 1080 machines were represented to the 
defendant as new 1naehines and according to plaintiff's 
testimony, the plaintiff did not examine the machines 
before shipment to defendant and didn't know of their 
condition (Tr. 42, 43, 51). After defendant, Jack Mas-
terson, had taken the two Model 1080's to Panguitch, 
he noticed that upon unpacking the crates, the mechanical 
portions of these phonographs were covered with rust 
and corrosion (Tr. 69). 
After spending three or four days on each machine 
in removing the rust and corrosion (R. 69), defendant 
placed the machines on location, one at Ruby's Cafe, 
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Escalante, Utah, and the other at the Big Rock Candy 
Mountain in Marysvale Canyon. The machines were 
out on location for approximately five weeks, when the 
defendant removed the same because they did not oper-
ate satisfactorily (Tr. 71). 
Defendant testified that one or two extra serVIce 
calls were required each week on the Model 1080's after 
they were placed on location ( Tr. 72). He testified that 
the trouble was caused principally by the changer jam-
ming (Tr. 73). In April of 1950, Knudsen, the president 
of plaintiff, had a conversation with defendant regarding 
the jamming of the machines, and Knudsen advised him 
to use some oils to rectify the situation. Later, defend-
ant wrote the plaintiff stating that he was going to lose 
his two best locations if the Model 1080's were not re-
moved (Tr. 76). 
The testimony is uncontradicted that the machines 
would not operate until the rust and corrosion was 
cleaned off (Tr. 84), and that the machines would not 
retain an adjustment. The evidence is also uncontra-
dicted that the changers, which are an integral part 
of the machines, would jam continually, requiring addi-
tional service calls at a great expense to defendant (Tr. 
86). The testimony of Perry Masterson, defendant's 
son, who was employed by his father for a short time 
in servicing the machines, was also to the effect that 
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the changer jannning- '""a~ the n1ain en use of the trouble, 
and that it 'vas necessary to n1ake one or t'vo Pxtra serv-
ice calls per 'Yeek in keeping the t"'"o n1achines operating 
(Tr. 95, 96, 97). 
\Y-esley I\::nudsen, president of plaintiff company, 
testified that the Inachines were repossessed in April 
of 1950, due to the non-payinent of installments as pro-
vided for in the contract (Ex. A). 
On June 30, in preparing an inventory for tax pur-
poses, the plaintiff testified that it utilized \vha.t is known 
as a cash-box price list, giving the average retail value 
of the various types of coin operated music machines, 
and set up the value of the inventory solely on the basis 
of the average prices according to the cash box list (Tr. 
29, 31, 40), but no cash box price list was received in 
evidence. The value of the repossessed machines as of 
June 30, the end of plaintiff's fiscal year, was arrived 
at arbitrarily by giving a credit to the defendant on 
plaintiffs books of a certain amount supposedly repre-
senting the value of the property at the time . (Ex. E, 
Tr. 29, 31). 
After repossession, the music machines were put on 
the floor of plaintiff's sales room and offered for sale 
to anyone that came into the sales room (Tr. 25). The 
machines were not differentiated from the other 
machines on the floor and were off2red for sale along 
with regular merchandise. Plaintiff, Wesley Knudsen, 
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testified that he didn't know where the machines had 
gone until we checked on the price on the list (Tr. 26). 
The machines were not marked as separate 1nachines 
on repossession (Tr. 26). The Gisn1o machine was arbi-
trarily given a value of $35.00 without any reference to 
a market value at the time or without any evidence of 
a resale value (Tr. 15, 16). 
One Model 1015 Wurlitzer phonograph could not 
be traced and plaintiff testified that it was not known 
how much it had sold for, but he thought that it had 
been sold. Plaintiff also testified that they could not 
trace this particular machine inasmuch as it had no 
serial number by which it could be traced (Ex. A, Tr. 
19, 20, 50, 55). Wesley Knudsen, president of plaintiff 
company, testified that, after the machines were repos-
sessed, he acted as owner and tried to sell the machines 
to anyone that came along and that the same were resold 
over a period of four or five months after repossession 
(Tr. 47), but all evidence of resale was stricken from the 
record upon plaintiff's motion (Tr. 39). After repos-
session of the machines, plaintiff filed this action to 
recover damages for the breach of the contract. At the 
trial of the case the only evidence adduced as to the value 
of the machines at the time of repossession was a journal 
entry from plaintiff's books, showing a credit of $1,150.00 
for the four music boxes, plus $35.00 for the Gismo 
machine (Ex. E). The price or value of these machines, 
except the Gismo, was arrived at without reference to 
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the actual resale value of the particuln r 1naehines 1n-
volYed. The rredit \\yas giYen defendant as of tl une 30, 
at the time of making the inventory, 'vhich 'vas prepared 
priinarily for the purpose of ascertaining the amount 
of taxes due by plaintiff (Tr. 15, 16, 26, 27). The de-
fendant in his answer denied that the contract was ever 
completed and alleged that the contract was rescinded 
(R. 6). 
The Court in its findings at page 115, stated that 
the plaintiff sues to recover damages for breach of con-
tract (Tr. 115). The Court further found that the con-
tract is a title retaining obligation (117), and that, al-
though there were some minor defects in the machines, 
the Court found that there was no representation on 
the part of the plaintiff as to the condition of the 
machines, and that any representation made or defect 
in the machines is innnaterial (Tr. 117). 
At page 119 of the record, the Court stated its find-
ings as follows: 
"The Court therefore finds that the plaintiff 
has been damaged in a breach of the contract in 
the sum of $7 48.11." 
Defendant appeals from the judgment entered. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF, SAID JUDGMENT BEING 
CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING FINDING OF FACT No. 4, TO THE EFFECT THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS DONE AND PERFORMED ALL OF 
THE STIPULATIONS AND CONDITIONS OF THE CON-
TRACT TO BE PERFORMED BY IT, SAID FINDING BEING 
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING FINDING OF FACT No. 9, TO THE EFFECT THAT 
THE SUl\1 OF $1,185.00 WAS THE REASONABLE VALUE 
OF THE MACHINES, SAID FINDING BEING CONTRARY 
TO THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING FINDING OF FACT No. 10, TO THE EFFECT THAT. 
ANY DEFECT IN THE MACHINES IS IMMATERIAL, AND 
FINDING OF FACT No. 11, TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE 
IS NO EVIDENCE OF A RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT, 
SAID FINDINGS BEING CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING CONCLUSION OF LAW No.1, TO THE EFFECT THAT 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT AGAINST 
THE DEFENDANT IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,860.96, THERE 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR Of PLAINTIFF, SAID JUDGMENT BEING 
CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE. 
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Appellanfs first point is that the trial eourt erred 
in entering judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and that 
the judgrnent is contrary to the law and the evidence. 
The trial court found, in effect, that plaintiff, after 
repossession of the rnachines, had been darnaged by 
defendant's breach of contract and was entitled to the 
difference between the contract price and the market 
value of the n1achines at the time of the alleged breach. 
It is defendant's contention that the rights of parties 
after such repossession were to be deterrnined solely by 
the terms of the contract, and after the goods are re-
taken by the seller, the buyer shall not be liable until 
the goods have been resold and insufficient realized 
therefrom to pay the balance due seller. There was no 
evidence that any of the machines had been re-sold (Tr. 
39), and it is defendant's further contention that plain-
tiff's suit was prematurely filed and should be dismissed 
because of failure to sell any of the machines in question 
prior to instituting this action. In the case of Rhodes v. 
O'Neil, et al. (Wash.), 265 Pac. 737, the court, in con-
struing a similar provision in a conditional sales con-
tract, stated at page 738 of Vol. 265 of the Pacific 
Reporter: 
"The note provided for a resale at public or 
private sale and an agreement to pay any balance 
remaining after the net proceeds had been applied. 
There had been no sale of the automobile, ·and 
therefore could be no application of net proceeds 
as provided in the note. The contingency named 
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in the note had not yet arrived, even if it be 
assumed, as appellants contend, that MacDonald 
was bound by his note to pay the balance due. 
"The judg1nent is affirmed." 
Under the contract sued upon, the rights and rem-
edies of the parties after repossession are clearly set 
out. Paragraph 6 of Ex. A provides in part as follows : 
"In the event of such repossession seller may 
resell the said property at either public or private 
sale without demand for performance, with or 
without notice to purchaser (if given notice by 
mail to address below shall be sufficient) with 
or without having such property at the place of 
sale., and upon such terms and in such manner 
as seller may determine; seller may bid at any 
sale. The proceeds of any such sale, after deduct-
ing all liens, expenses for retaking, repairing and 
selling such property, including a reasonable at-
torney fee or other expense incurred, shall be ap-
plied to the amount due under this contract and 
the surplus, if any, shall be paid to purchaser; in 
the event of a deficiency remaining after the exer-
cise of any of the remedies herein provided for, 
purchaser agrees to pay the amount of such de-
ficiency forthwith and any reasonable attorney 
fee and court costs incurred for the recovery of 
such deficiency." , 
The above provision is identical, word for word, to 
a clause construed in the case of Hampton v. Commercial 
Credit Corporation, et al (Mont.), 176 P. (2d) 270. See 
page 274 of Vol. 176 of the Pacific Reporter, 2nd Series, 
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where the court ~et8 out in full paragraph 6 of the con-
tract there being considered, \Yhich is identical to para-
graph 6 of Exhibit A. The question arose in that case 
as to when the rights of a buyer under the conditional 
sales contract \\·ere ter1ninated. The following language 
appears at page 27 4 of the Pacific Reporter: 
··4.\.ppellants' contention that plaintiff had no 
interest in the automobile or in the conditional 
sale contract after the automobile had been re-
possessed by the Commercial Credit Corporation 
on July 25, 1942, cannot be sustained. The con-
ditional sale contract reads in part as follows : 
'The undersigned Seller hereby agrees to 
sell, and the undersigned Purchaser agrees to 
purchase, subject to the terms and conditions 
hereinafter set forth, * * *' 
"6. Time is of the essence of the con-
tract and if Purchaser defaults in complying 
\vith any of the terms or conditions hereof, 
or Seller deem himself insecure or the prop-
erty in danger of misuse, depreciation or con-
fiscation, * * *. The proceeds of any such 
sale, after deducting all liens, expenses for 
retaking, repairing and selling such property, 
including a reasonable attorney fee or other 
expense incurred, shall be applied to the 
amount due under this contract and the sur-
plus, if any, shall be paid to Purchaser; in the 
event of a deficiency remaining after the 
exercise of any of the remedies herein pro-
vided for, Purchaser agrees to pay the 
amount of such deficiency forthwith and any 
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reasonable attorney fee and court costs in-
curred for the recovery of such deficiency.' 
(Emphasis ours.) 
"The defendants exercising a right or option 
under the contract, to-wit: The sale of the auto-
mobile on December 22, 1942, to Seavey; the 
plain tiff under the terms and conditions of the 
contract would have been entitled to receive any 
surplus of the proceeds of the sale, consequently 
the contract was not terminated before the date 
of the sale, which date was subsequent to the en-
actment of the amendment to the Soldiers' and 
Sailors' Civil Relief Act." 
In the case at bar, the defendant's rights in the con-
tract were not terminated until a resale of the 1nusic 
machines, and the plaintiffs could have no right to dan1-
ages at the time of the alleged default. In the case of 
Hampton v. Commercial Credit Corporation, supra, the 
Supreme Court of Washington issued a supplemental 
opinion on rehearing as to the question of when the 
buyer's rights terminated. At page 279 of the Pacific 
Reporter, 2nd S.eries, appears the following: 
"On rehearing the appellants contend that 
the repossession of the automobile on July 25, 
1942, after the default of Hampton, completely 
terminated the conditional sale contract and that, 
consequently, the Soldie-rs' and Sailors' Civil Re-
lief Act as amended October 6, 1942, 50 U.S.C.A. 
Appendix, § 501 et seq., has no application. 
"With this contention we cannot agree. 
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·· .... -tfter the repossession of the aufo1nobile the. 
contract (subject to applicable statutes) still 
measured the rights and renredies of the parties 
thereto, and -it u·as to the. ternzs of the contract 
that the parties had to resort, or rely upon, in as-
se rtilrg a-ny claims or rights after repossession. 
Hit follows that the rights and remedies of 
the parties under the contract were not completely 
extinguished at the time of the repossession of 
the auton1obile. ~When the law speaks of a right 
or obligation as extinguished, it means that it is 
put out; taken away, destroyed.' 35 C. J. S·., Ex-
tinguish, page 293. 
'~It also follows that the contract was not com-
pletely terminated by the repossession of the 
automobile. ·'Termination' or 'cancellation' of a 
conditional contract means to abrogate so much 
of it as remains unperformed, doing away with an 
existing agreement upon the terms and with the 
consequences mentioned in the writing * * * ." San:. 
born v. Ballanfonte, 98 Cal. App. 482, 277 P. 152, 
155. 
"The termination of a conditional contract, as 
stated in the case of Sanborn v. Ballanfonte, 98 
Cal. App. 482, 277 P. 152, mea~s to put an end to 
all of the unperformed portions thereof." Blodgett 
v. Merritt Annex Oil Co., 19 Cal. App. 2d 169, 65 
p. 2d 123, 125. 
"It is clear that the conditional sale contract 
was not fully terminated prior to December 22, 
1942, for the reason. that the defendants having 
sold the a11rtomobile on the above date, the rights, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
liabilities and remedies of the parties were. not 
fully determined or terminated under the contract 
nntil that time and therefore the Soldiers' and 
Sailors' Civil Relief Act applies." 
Plaintiff's rights after repossession were governed 
by the provisions of the con tract (Ex. A.). There is no 
evidence of a resale to the account of the buyer. The 
plaintiff took the merchandise back into his display roorn 
and treated the repossessed stock as he would any other 
(Tr. 26). He testified that he acted as owner of the same, 
and there was no evidence of a resale within any reason-
able period after repossession, or at all. Knudsen, presi-
dent of plaintiff company, testified that he had no idea 
what happened to the music machines after being placed 
on the sales floor, until he checked his records (Tr. 26). 
In preparing an inventory of his complete stock of mer-
chandise for tax purposes, Knudsen arbitrarily placed 
a value on all items and equipment used in his business, 
among which were included the machines repossessed 
from defendant. It is defendant's contention that such 
conduct, and refraining from selling the machines to the 
account of buyer for a reasonable time, precludes any 
recovery whatsoever, and further, that the buyer is 
not bound to accept as credit the value of the repossessed 
property at the time of taking. The burden of showing 
a resale is upon the seller. 
In a syllabus prepared by the court in the case of 
Hargett v. M~tscogee Bank, Court of Appeals of Georgia, 
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124 S.E. 541, the court stated the general rules applicable 
to the above facts, as follows : 
'-3. In a suit by the seller against the pur-
chaser to recover the unpaid purchase 1noney, 
where the seller has retaken the property, the 
evidence will not authorize a recovery for the 
plaintiff in any a1nount whatever until the plain-
tiff has carried the burden of showing a resale 
of the property under the terms of the contract 
and the amount realized by him upon such re-
sale. * * * 
H 4. It is the purchaser's right under the 
contract to have the property resold after it has 
been retaken by the seller, and therefore the pur-
chaser is not bound to accept, as a credit upon the 
unpaid purchase money, an amount representing 
the value of the property at the time it is retaken 
by the seller. 
"5. * * * Where, however, the seller, after 
retaking the property for the purpose of resale 
as provided in the contract, refrains from selling 
it for an unreasonable length of time, and devotes 
it to a use inconsistent with an intention upon his 
part to resell it as the agent of the purchaser, the 
inference that the seller has converted the prop-
erty to his own use and has thereby rescinded the 
sale is authorized." 
It is admitted that in a proper case, a deficiency 
can be recovered, but only after a resale, if the contract 
so provides. The general rule is set forth in Volume 3, 
Jones on Chattel Mortgages & Conditional Sales, Bowers 
Ed., Sec. 1327, as follows: 
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"§ 1327 Recovering deficiency after re-
sale.-There are rillinerous forms of conditional 
sale contracts which have caused many divergent 
opinions relating to questions arising under them. 
Many of such contracts provide that on default 
of the buyer the seller may take possession and 
sell the property on account of the buyer, credit-
ing him with the proceeds of the resale, and hold 
hin1 liable for any deficiency in the price. As a 
general rule, the validity of such a stipulation 
is given full effect by the courts, and the seller 
is held entitled, after a resale in accordance with 
the provisions of the contract, to sue and recover 
any balance remaining after crediting on the pur-
chase-price the proceeds of the. sale. This effect 
has been given to a stipulation authorizing the 
seller to retake possession and resell, as this 
necessarily implies that the resale shall be on ac-
count of the buyer, and that any deficiency toward 
the satisfaction of the price shall be paid by the 
buyer." 
With respect to the right of the vendor under a 
conditional sales contract to recover damages, see Vol. 
3, Jones on ·Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales 
Supra, Section 1372 : 
"§ 1372. Against vendee for breach of con-
tract.-:!<· * * It is obvious that his remedy may not 
be in. damages for the mere default of the vendee 
in performing the condition of the contract for 
any action he then takes is either upon the con-
tracfor as a recission of it. He may, however, be 
entitled ·to damages for a wrongful detention of 
the goods." 
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One of the questions to be deter1nined on this appeal, 
according to appellanfs Yie"T' is 'vhether a conditional 
vendor, who after retaking goods does not sustain the 
burden of proving a resale in accordance with the stipu-
lations of the contract, is entitled to recover any portion 
of the balance due under the contract. A resale by the 
conditional vendor is not required by the contract, but 
failure to resell n1aterially affects the rights of the 
parties. It is submitted that under the contract sued upon 
the buyer is not liable until the goods retaken have been 
sold to his account, and in the absence of showing a re-
sale, the seller has no other remedy. 
The trial court substituted its own remedies in place· 
of those the parties to the contract had agreed upon. 
This it can not do. Regardless of the theory we attach 
to plaintiff's case, it is submitted that the judgment can-
not be sustained, and is contrary to the law and the evi-
dence. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN M.AKING AND ENTER-
ING FINDING OF FACT No. 4, TO THE EFFECT THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS DONE AND PERFOR.MED ALL OF 
THE STIPULATIONS AND CONDITIONS OF THE CON-
TRACT TO BE PERFORMED BY IT, SAID FINDING BEING 
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE. 
Because of their defective condition, defendant had 
returned two Model 1100's to plaintiff in exchange for 
two new Model 1080's, at the time of entering into the 
contract sued upon. A brief perusal of the record will 
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indicate the difficulties encountered by defendant in at-
tempting to operate these supposedly new machines. 
These 1080's were rusted and corroded to the extent that 
they would not operate properly, and jammed continu-
ally. Defendant finally took them off location when cir-
cumstances became such· that he could not operate them 
further. These were supposely new machines (Ex. A). 
It is appellant's position that the plaintiff did not 
perform its contract in that the machines were not new 
machines, and because of plaintiff's breach there could be 
no default on the part of the defendant. See Estrich on 
Installment Sales, Sec. 305, which reads as follows: 
"Until seller has complied with his agree-
ments, there can be no default on the part of the 
buyer entitling the seller to take possession." 
See Jones on Chattel Mortgages and Conditional 
Sales, supra, Vol. 3, S·ec. 1285 : 
"Where seller is at fault.-Analogous to the 
equitable principle that he who seeks equity must 
do equity, is the legal rule pertinent to the present 
discussion, that a conditional vendor who asserts 
rights based on the alleged default of his vendee 
can not maintain them if. he himself is in default 
in the performance of some phase of the contract 
obligatory upon him. 
It is submitted that said finding is contrary to the 
evidence. 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING FINDING OF FACT No. 9, TO THE EFFECT THAT 
THE SUM OF $1,185.00 WAS THE REASONABLE VALUE 
OF THE MACHINES, SAID FINDING BEING CONTRARY 
TO THE EVIDENCE. 
Appellant's point three raises the question of 
whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain a finding 
that $1,185.00 was the reasonable value of the machines 
at the time the credit was entered on plaintiff's books. 
From appellant's viewpoint the value of the machines 
as of June 30, 1950 has no bearing on the rights of the 
parties involved, and becomes of importance only if it 
can be said that the trial court proceeded under the cor-
rect theory of law. 
There is no evidence of the value of the "Gismo" 
machine, except that a value of $35.00 was placed on it 
in the journal entry, without reference to its actual mar-
ket value or resale value at the time (Tr. 15, 16). 
There is no evidence that the value placed on the 
music machines in the journal entry corresponded to 
Cash Box Price Lists, or that the actual resale value, or 
mechanical condition at the time, of each machine was 
considered. Further, theTe was no evidence whatsoe,ver 
as to the value of one of the Model 1015's repossessed by 
plaintiff. One of the Model 1015's could not be traced by 
serial number, and the matter of its value was left en-
tirely to conjecture (Tr. 19, 20, 50, 55). 
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It is submitted that plaintiff failed in its burden of 
proof, and that said finding is contrary to the evidence. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING FINDING OF FACT No. 10, TO THE EFFECT THAT 
ANY DEFECT IN THE MACHINES IS IMMATERIAL, AND 
FINDING OF FACT No. 11, TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE 
IS NO EVIDENCE OF A RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT, 
SAID FINDINGS BEING CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE. 
Considerable testimony was received in support of 
defendant's contention that the Model 1080's were de-
fective, and the trial court held that any defe.cts were 
immaterial. The machines were put on location in the 
early part of March, 1950 (Tr. 70). During the early 
part of April, 1950, defendant testified that he advised 
plaintiff of the defective condition of the machines in a 
phone call (Tr. 75). Later in April, 1950, defendant 
wrote plaintiff a letter to the e,ffect that he was going to 
lose his two best locations if the Model 1080's were not 
removed, and that he just couldn't go further with them 
(Tr. 76). Defendant also testified as to a conversation 
in plaintiff's office during the latter part of April, 1950, 
relative to picking up the machines (Tr. 77). Defendant 
testified that he would not pay for the truck to come 
down and pick up the machines because of a previous 
misunderstanding with plaintiff about a shipment of ma-
chines from Denver whe-re he was stuck for a big freight 
bill (Tr. 77). The evidence is unoontradicted that con-
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tinual jamming of the machines \Vas due to the corro-
sion and pitted condition, \vhich defendant was unable 
to correct. 
It is appellant's contention that the defects in the 
machines were material, and that defendant was entitled 
to, and did, rescind the sale, and his liability under the 
contract ended. The general rules as to a defense to an 
action of this type are set out in Jones on Chattel Mort-
gages and Conditional Sales, Vol. 3, Sec.1331: 
"§ 1331. Defenses and counterclaims to 
purchase-price action. - * * * Rescission of the 
contract is a defense to an action for the purchase-
price, if the facts show the essential elements of 
a rescission and prompt and sufficient acts of 
the vendee thereunder. The -rescission may have 
been on account of failure of the vendor to do 
something promised, or of fraud or false repre-
sentations in the making of the contract and 
which induced its making. Thus, neglect of the 
conditional vendor to keep a typewriter in repair 
as promised was held sufficient ground for a 
rescission. One of the essentials of a rescission 
is that the vendee must return, or offer to return, 
the goods to the vendor or show why such return 
can not be made. Moreover, the right of rescission 
must be exercised promptly upon discovery by 
the vendee of the facts which give rise to it, as 
where the vendor is claimed to have made false 
representations concerning the property." 
Further, it is appellant's contention that an implied 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose existed, and 
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upon breach of this, defendant was entitled to, and in 
fact rescinded the contract. In the case Battle Creek 
Bread Wrap. Mach. Co. v. Paramount Baking Co., 88 
Utah 67, 39 P. (2d) 323, the Supreme Court of Utah 
stated, at page 72 of Vol. 88, Utah Reports, as follows: 
"The parties apparently recognized that the 
use of the trade-name of the machine was purely 
a matter of convenience in designation. These 
facts, considered along wi:th the fact that the 
replacement arose out of complaints of defective-
ness in the first machine, are rather substantial 
evidence of the fact that no reliance was placed 
upon the name of the article, but rather that the 
parties were concerned with its fitness to accom-
plish its pul-pose. * * * 
"However, we are of the opinion that there 
was an implied warranty of fitness as to the sub-
stituted machine. It is hard to believe otherwise 
when replacement arises out· of defects in the 
machine replaced." 
The taking of possession of the machines by plaintiff, 
and exercise of dominion over them as owner, and fail-
ure to resell, precluded any other remedy. S-ee I. X. L. 
Stores Co. v. Moon, 49 Utah 262, 162 Pac. 622. 
It is submitted tha;t the court erred in finding that 
the defects in the machines were immaterial, and that 
the contract was not in fact rescinded. 
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POINT \1". 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING CONCLUSION OF LAW No.1, TO THE EFFECT THAT 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT AGAINST 
THE DEFENDANT IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,860.96, THERE 
BEING NO FINDING OR EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
SAME. 
The court found, in its conclusions of law, that after 
repossession of the machines, plaintiff was entitled to a 
judgment in the sum of $1,860.96, the balance due on the 
contract. It is submitted that the court was clearly erron-
eous in so making and entering this conclusion of law. 
The general rule of law is well settled that a conditional 
vendor cannot retake and repossess the property and 
then recover the full balance of the contract price, as 
though there had been no retaking. I.X.L. Stores Co. 
v. Moon, supra. The proposition is so well settled as to 
require no further citation of authority, and it is sub-
mitted that the court erred in making and entering said 
conclusion of law, there being no finding or evidence to 
support the same. 
CONC·LUSION 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the judgment of 
the trial court was in error, and that the judgment should 
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be reversed and an appropriate order entered dismiss-
ing the action, and that appellant should be awarded its 
costs on this appeal. 
R~spectfully submitted, 
S-KEEN, THURMAN & WORSLEY and 
VERL C. RITCHIE, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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